Recording Law for Employers & Businesses in Kentucky

Kentucky’s wiretapping law allows employers to record any conversation they’re part of without telling the other person. The rule comes from Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 526, specifically KRS 526.010 and KRS 526.020. KRS 526.010 defines “eavesdrop” as intercepting “any part of a wire or oral communication of others without the consent of at least one (1) party thereto.” That means if an employee wearing smartglasses is talking with a customer, the employer can legally record the audio without the customer’s knowledge. The penalty for violating this rule is a Class D felony under KRS 526.020. The one-party consent rule applies uniformly regardless of location—public, workplace, or even another person’s home—because the statute itself contains no location-based exceptions. However, recording conversations inside another person’s home increases exposure under Kentucky’s separate common-law tort of invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion, which turns on reasonable expectation of privacy and is not a statutory carve-out.

Kentucky’s eavesdropping law only covers audio interception. Silent video recording—without any audio track—is not restricted by KRS Chapter 526. The only video-specific crime in Kentucky is KRS 531.100, called “video voyeurism.” That law applies only when someone records another person’s sexual conduct, genitals, or nipple of the female breast in a place where privacy is expected, such as a restroom or changing room. Recording a customer dispute or routine interaction with a smartglasses camera that has no audio is not covered by this law. So if your smartglasses capture video only, Kentucky law does not impose any restrictions on that recording.

The one-party consent rule only protects recordings where the employer (or employee) is part of the conversation. If the smartglasses pick up audio of two customers talking—neither of whom is the employee wearing the glasses—the recording may violate Kentucky’s eavesdropping law unless the wearer is an authorized party to that conversation. Kentucky applies a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis under common-law invasion-of-privacy/intrusion-upon-seclusion doctrine for these situations; while no controlling Kentucky appellate decision has squarely read an expectation-of-privacy gate into KRS 526 itself, non-binding penal-code commentary and one unreviewed trial ruling suggest such a gate might exist. For example, a loud argument in a crowded store aisle is less likely to carry a privacy expectation than a quiet conversation in a closed office. Employers should avoid recording bystanders unless the conversation is clearly public and loud.

Kentucky sits in the federal Sixth Circuit, which has not squarely recognized or rejected a general First Amendment right for citizens to record on-duty police performing public duties in public places, and this question remains open in a qualified-immunity posture. A recent Sixth Circuit case, Hils v. Davis, addressed a different scenario—police officers recording their own internal misconduct interviews—and did not resolve the broader question. Because this area of law is unsettled, employers should not assume a constitutional right exists. If the employee is directly interacting with the officer, the one-party consent rule under KRS 526.010 still applies. But if the glasses are capturing an officer’s conversation with a third party, treat this as a gray area and consult a lawyer before relying on it.

Kentucky’s Consumer Data Protection Act (KCDPA), effective January 1, 2026, adds a consent requirement for processing biometric data that identifies a specific person. Under KRS 367.3611(3), biometric data includes voiceprints only if they are used to uniquely identify someone; plain audio recordings not processed for identification are categorically excluded from the definition. If your smartglasses use voiceprints to enroll or identify the employee, you must obtain consent under KRS 367.3617(1)(e). The law also requires data minimization, reasonable security safeguards, and a reasonably accessible, clear, and meaningful privacy notice. The Attorney General enforces the KCDPA, with exclusive authority and a 30-day cure period before penalties up to $7,500 per continued violation. There is no private right of action. The KCDPA applies to entities controlling or processing personal data of at least 100,000 Kentucky consumers in a calendar year, or at least 25,000 consumers if more than 50% of gross revenue comes from the sale of personal data.

Kentucky’s eavesdropping statute, KRS Chapter 526, contains two narrow exceptions to the one‑party consent rule. KRS 526.070 allows liability only when the interception is willful and the communication is not overheard inadvertently on a party line or extension where the contents are not divulged, or when a common‑carrier employee acts within the scope of employment. These exceptions are strictly construed and do not create broad carve‑outs for location or context. Kentucky courts have not recognized a general "public place" exception in the statute itself; instead, a reasonable‑expectation‑of‑privacy analysis applies to third‑party conversations under common‑law tort doctrine, and no Kentucky appellate decision has squarely adopted a bright‑line "no expectation of privacy in public" rule for ordinary bystander recording, underscoring the need for fact‑specific analysis. Employers should avoid assuming that loud or public conversations are automatically outside the statute’s scope.

Kentucky’s legal ethics rules take a stricter stance than the modern ABA framework on undisclosed recording. Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion E‑279 (1984) holds that attorneys may not secretly record conversations with clients, other lawyers, judges, or the public outside a narrow criminal‑defense‑witness exception, deeming such conduct a breach of the ethics rules because it involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation under the predecessor to SCR 3.130(8.4)(c). Opinion E‑289 (1984) extends this to advising clients on secret recording in civil matters, allowing only qualified advice that goes beyond restating the law to include weighing fairness and social consequences, and is the only KBA opinion to cite Kentucky’s eavesdropping statute (KRS 526.010) in this context. Neither opinion has been superseded, and no later Kentucky authority addresses the issue, leaving uncertainty about whether the current bar would apply these 1984 opinions unchanged under the modern ethics rules.

Imagine a retail employee wearing smartglasses that record video and audio during a customer return. The employee is part of the conversation, so the audio recording is legal under Kentucky’s one‑party consent rule; however, this rule only resolves the statute’s scope, and a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis may still apply to third-party conversations under common-law tort doctrine. The silent video recording is unrestricted. If the glasses also pick up audio of two other customers arguing nearby, that portion of the recording could be illegal because the employee is not a party to that conversation and the customers may have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The employer should configure the glasses to mute or exclude bystander audio unless the conversation is clearly public and loud. If the glasses process audio to create voiceprints for employee identification, consent under the KCDPA is required.

Kentucky’s eavesdropping statute, KRS Chapter 526, is limited to audio interception and does not restrict video-only recording. Silent video capture—even in private settings—is not covered by the statute unless the footage is used or disclosed in a manner that implicates another law. The only video-specific criminal provision in Kentucky is KRS 531.100 (video voyeurism), which applies narrowly to recordings of a person’s sexual conduct, genitals, or nipple of the female breast in a place where privacy is expected, such as a restroom or changing room. Routine interactions, disputes, or police encounters captured on video without audio do not fall within this statute. Additionally, Kentucky’s eavesdropping statute does not distinguish between in-person and electronic communications; both are treated the same under the one-party consent rule.

Recording conversations inside another person’s home can trigger Kentucky’s common-law tort of invasion of privacy or intrusion upon seclusion, even if the recording does not violate the eavesdropping statute. Liability under these tort theories turns on whether the recorded party had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation, which is a fact-specific inquiry. The eavesdropping statute itself contains no location-based carve-outs, so the one-party consent rule applies uniformly regardless of where the conversation occurs. However, the risk of a tort claim increases when recording inside another person’s home because the setting heightens expectations of privacy. Employers should exercise caution in such environments and consider obtaining consent or avoiding third-party conversations.