Recording Law for Police & Civil Rights in Indiana

Indiana has no law requiring consent to record on-duty police officers performing their duties in public. The Seventh Circuit, which covers Indiana, has recognized a First Amendment right to record police carrying out their official duties in public under ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). Indiana’s own wiretap statute only governs interception of electronic communications, not open in-person recording. The statute defines “electronic communication” at Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-110 as a transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence transmitted by wire, radio, or an electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical system. Ordinary face-to-face speech isn’t transmitted by any of those means, so it falls outside the statute entirely. A person recording an on-duty officer from more than a purely arbitrary distance, in public, without physically interfering, is on solid First Amendment/Alvarez footing in the Seventh Circuit, but should be aware the 25-foot statute still nominally exists and its enforceability is in active, unsettled litigation.

Indiana passed a law making it a Class C misdemeanor to approach within 25 feet of an officer after being told to stop, even if you’re recording. The law is Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-14 (effective July 1, 2023, P.L.67-2023). But on August 5, 2025, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of that law on vagueness grounds in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita, No. 24-2927 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025). The case is still on remand as of spring 2026, so the law isn’t enforceable against anyone while that litigation continues. Indiana later enacted a second buffer law, Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-15 (effective July 1, 2025), which conditions a stop-approaching order on the officer’s reasonable belief the person’s presence will interfere with duties; this new statute remains in effect and is not covered by the preliminary injunction against § 35-44.1-2-14. Recording from within 25 feet of an officer is not automatically illegal, but the original 25-foot statute remains on the books and its ultimate fate is unsettled pending the remand.

Indiana’s wiretap statute (Ind. Code art. 35-33.5) only criminalizes interception of an “electronic communication,” defined at Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-110 as a transfer transmitted by wire, radio, or an electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical system. A phone call, VoIP call, text, or email qualifies, but ordinary face-to-face speech does not. Because the statute is scoped by transmission medium, not by a speaker’s expectation of privacy, recording an in-person conversation in public or in your own home is not covered by the wiretap statute. Silent video-only recording with an attended camera is also unrestricted. The statute’s penalties (Level 5 felony for unlawful interception under Ind. Code § 35-33.5-5-5, plus a civil cause of action under Ind. Code § 35-33.5-5-4) simply don’t apply to open, in-person recording.

Indiana has a statute aimed at covert, unattended cameras on another person’s private property (Ind. Code § 35-46-8.5-1), but it does not restrict a person from openly recording inside their own home or from wearing an attended camera anywhere. The law only criminalizes placing a camera or surveillance equipment that records unattended on the private property of another person without consent. If you’re recording on your own property or with an attended device, the statute does not restrict that conduct. The statute expressly exempts law-enforcement officers’ own recording devices and does not impose any heightened consent requirement specific to in-home recording under Indiana law for this use case.

Indiana’s wiretap statute does not address the recording of in-person conversations. The state’s interception statute is limited to communications transmitted by wire, radio, or an electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical system, so ordinary unassisted speech falls outside its scope. One non-precedential appellate decision supports this reading: Whitt v. Town of New Carlisle, No. 20A-CT-2279, 2021 WL 2010143, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. May 20, 2021) (mem.). No Indiana appellate or supreme court decision was found squarely holding whether a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy exception applies to public recording, and the researcher’s own confidence on that specific point is explicitly lower than on the statutory text. Because the statute’s definitions make the analysis largely unnecessary for open, in-public recording, courts have not squarely addressed the issue, leaving it an unsettled area of Indiana law. In practice, recording an in-person conversation in public or in your own home is not covered by the wiretap statute, but speakers who manifestly attempt not to be overheard or who use listening aids may raise open questions under Indiana law.

Indiana’s ethics opinion states it is unethical for a lawyer to secretly record another lawyer during a legal matter without informing them first. The Indiana State Bar Association Legal Ethics Committee’s Opinion No. 1 of 2000 states verbatim: “Although it is not illegal in the state of Indiana to tape record another person without that person’s knowledge, it is unethical for an attorney to do this to another attorney in the context of a pending legal matter without informing him first.” The opinion calls such recording “fundamentally deceitful and dishonest.” The recorded attorney was counsel for the employer of a potential witness, not opposing counsel in the malpractice suit itself. This is an advisory ethics opinion, not a court rule, but it reflects Indiana’s position on undisclosed recording between attorneys in legal matters.

Indiana does not have a dedicated biometric privacy statute like Illinois’ BIPA. Instead, the Indiana Consumer Data Protection Act (ICDPA/INCDPA), effective January 1, 2026, treats biometric data as a subcategory of sensitive data requiring opt-in consent. Under Ind. Code § 24-15-2-4, biometric data is defined as data generated by automatic measurements of an individual’s biological characteristics used to identify a specific individual, but it explicitly excludes raw audio or video recordings and data derived from them. A voiceprint template derived from a recording to distinguish wearer from bystanders would qualify as biometric data and, when used for unique identification, as sensitive data under Ind. Code § 24-15-2-28. The statute only applies to controllers processing personal data of at least 100,000 Indiana residents annually, or at least 25,000 residents where more than 50% of gross revenue comes from the sale of personal data (Ind. Code § 24-15-1-1). If covered, controllers must obtain consent before processing sensitive data (Ind. Code § 24-15-4-1), defined as a clear affirmative act signifying freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous agreement (Ind. Code § 24-15-2-7). Enforcement is AG-exclusive with a mandatory 30-day cure period (Ind. Code §§ 24-15-10-1, -10-3), civil penalties capped at $7,500 per violation (Ind. Code § 24-15-10-2), and no private right of action (Ind. Code § 24-15-10-4).

Under Indiana’s wiretap statute, unlawful interception is a Level 5 felony (Ind. Code § 35-33.5-5-5). A civil cause of action is also available, allowing recovery of the greater of actual damages, $100 per day of violation, or $1,000, plus punitive damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs, with a two-year statute of limitations (Ind. Code § 35-33.5-5-4). The statute includes a good-faith warrant defense. These penalties apply only to interception of electronic communications as defined in Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-110 and do not reach open, in-person recording.

Indiana’s wiretap statute includes several narrow carve-outs to the definition of “interception.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-176 excludes from the offense conduct that occurs through the use of an “electronic, mechanical, or other device” to intercept an “electronic communication” when the communication is configured so that it is readily accessible to the general public, such as a cordless or cellular telephone call that is transmitted over an unencrypted radio channel. The statute also excludes from the offense the use of a hearing aid or similar device to correct the user’s auditory impairment. These carve-outs reflect the legislature’s intent to avoid criminalizing routine conduct that does not implicate privacy interests in the same way as surreptitious interception.

Recording at protests, demonstrations, and large public gatherings in Indiana is generally unrestricted under the wiretap statute because such settings typically involve ordinary in-person speech that is not transmitted by wire, radio, or an electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical system. The Seventh Circuit’s Alvarez line of cases also protects the right to record police officers performing their duties at such events. However, if an officer issues a lawful order to disperse or to cease recording under a valid time/place/manner restriction, compliance with that order is required regardless of the recording’s legality under the wiretap statute. The buffer law’s current injunction does not immunize proximity violations if the officer’s order is not a stop-approaching order under the enjoined statute.

Indiana’s wiretap statute does not create heightened consent requirements for recording in healthcare facilities, schools, or other sensitive settings. Ordinary in-person speech in these locations is not an “electronic communication” under Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-110, so it falls outside the statute’s scope. Separate facility policies or professional codes of conduct may impose restrictions, but they are not enforced as criminal or civil liability under the wiretap statute. The Indiana Consumer Data Protection Act’s biometric provisions may apply if a voiceprint or other biometric template is generated and processed in these settings, but only if the controller meets the statute’s applicability thresholds.