Is It Legal to Record a Conversation in Indiana?

Statute · Penalty: mixed

Ind. Code § 35-33.5-5-5 (classification of the offense of "unlawful interception," Level 5 felony) and § 35-33.5-5-4 (civil cause of action/damages), read together with the operative definition of "interception" at Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-176 (limited to "electronic communication"). Related, directly relevant statutes for this use case: Ind. Code § 35-46-8.5-1 (Unlawful Photography, Surveillance, and Tracking on Private Property — the video/camera-specific statute) and Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-14 (Unlawful Encroachment on an Investigation — the 25-foot police "buffer law," Class C misdemeanor, currently under a Seventh Circuit-affirmed preliminary injunction in Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita, No. 24-2927 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025)).

In-person vs. phone & video calls

Indiana's core "wiretap" statute (Article 35-33.5, "Interception of Telephonic or Telegraphic Communications," now covering "electronic communication" generally) is narrower than it first appears: "interception" is defined at Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-176 as the intentional recording/acquisition of the contents of an "electronic communication" (which under Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-110 tracks the federal ECPA-style definition — transmissions by wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system) by someone who is not a sender or receiver, without consent of a sender or receiver. Because a phone call/text/email/VoIP transmission is a "communication" moving between two parties, only ONE of those parties needs to consent (one-party consent) for a participant (or someone the participant lets listen in) to lawfully record it — this is squarely a phone/electronic-communication rule. Indiana has no separate, generally-applicable "eavesdropping" statute reaching ordinary face-to-face/in-person oral conversations the way many two-party-consent states do; recording an in-person dispute or an in-person exchange with a police officer with a wearable device is not "intercepting" an "electronic communication" between two other parties, so Article 33.5 does not appear to reach it at all (multiple sources, including RCFP's Indiana guide, flag this as unresolved by case law — i.e., it's an "unclear/not directly addressed" area for pure in-person oral recording, though the statute's text strongly supports that it's simply out of scope).

Recording in public

Indiana's interception statute is not framed around a "public place" carve-out because, per its own scope, it never reaches ordinary in-person or public-place audio/video recording in the first place (see communication_split_notes) — it only governs interception of electronic communications between other parties. No Indiana appellate/supreme court decision was found squarely holding there is (or is not) a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy exception for public recording under this statute, because the statute's own definitions make that analysis largely unnecessary for open, in-public recording. Separately, the Seventh Circuit's Alvarez line of cases (recognizing a First Amendment right to record government officials, including police, performing duties in public) supplies the operative public-place protection for this use case's recording of disputes/police interactions in public. Confidence on the "no case law directly addresses it" point is lower than on the statutory text itself.

Recording at home

No statute gives a stricter rule for recording inside one's own home; if anything the opposite structure exists. Ind. Code § 35-46-8.5-1 ("Unlawful Photography, Surveillance, and Tracking on Private Property") criminalizes knowingly/intentionally placing a camera or electronic surveillance equipment that "records images or data of any kind while unattended on the private property of ANOTHER person without the consent of the owner or tenant" (Class A misdemeanor; Level 6 felony with certain priors or if the actor is subject of a protective order). By its terms this only reaches covert/unattended cameras placed on someone else's property — it does not restrict a person recording (worn, handheld, or otherwise attended) inside their own home, and it does not restrict a person wearing a live/attended body camera anywhere. There is no heightened consent requirement specific to in-home recording under Indiana law for this use case.

Recording the police

Indiana is in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the SEVENTH CIRCUIT, which recognized a First Amendment right to record police performing their duties in public in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) — cited as controlling on this point in the Indiana cases below. Indiana has no statutory "law-enforcement consent exception" needed for bystander recording of officers, because its wiretap statute (35-33.5) only reaches interception of electronic communications, not open recording of an in-person scene, and Ind. Code § 35-46-8.5-1(a)(3) expressly exempts law-enforcement officers' OWN recording devices, not civilian recording of officers. The more operative statute for this use case is Indiana's "buffer law," Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-14 ("Unlawful Encroachment on an Investigation"): "A person who knowingly or intentionally approaches within twenty-five (25) feet of a law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the execution of the law enforcement officer's duties after the law enforcement officer has ordered the person to stop approaching commits unlawful encroachment on an investigation, a Class C misdemeanor" (effective July 1, 2023, P.L.67-2023). Two Seventh Circuit decisions bear directly on it: (1) Nicodemus v. City of South Bend, 137 F.4th 654 (7th Cir. 2025) — rejected a facial First Amendment "unbridled discretion" challenge, holding the buffer law is a content-neutral, reasonable time/place/manner restriction (did not reach vagueness, which the challenger disclaimed); and (2) Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita, No. 24-2927 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025) — affirmed a district-court PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION barring enforcement of the buffer law against the plaintiffs on Fourteenth Amendment vagueness grounds (officers had unfettered discretion over when to issue a stop-approaching order), and remanded only on the scope of injunctive relief. As of the most recent reporting found (spring 2026), that remand was still pending in the Southern District of Indiana, so the buffer law remains judicially enjoined as to at least the RCFP plaintiffs while its ultimate fate is litigated — a person recording an on-duty officer from more than a purely arbitrary distance, in public, without physically interfering, is on solid First Amendment/Alvarez footing in the Seventh Circuit, but should be aware the 25-foot statute still nominally exists and its enforceability is in active, unsettled litigation. While the Rokita appeal was pending, Indiana enacted a second buffer law, Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-15 (eff. July 1, 2025), which conditions a stop-approaching order on the officer's reasonable belief the person's presence will interfere with duties; it is codified adjacent to § -14, does not repeal it, and is NOT covered by the preliminary injunction against § -14 -- § 35-44.1-2-15 remains currently in effect.

Video-only capture (no audio)

Silent, video-only recording (no audio) captured openly/attended (e.g., worn on a person) is NOT restricted by Ind. Code § 35-33.5 (that article only covers "interception" of "electronic communications," i.e., audio/data transmissions between parties — not ambient video). The one Indiana statute that specifically regulates cameras/video, Ind. Code § 35-46-8.5-1 ("Unlawful Photography, Surveillance, and Tracking on Private Property"), only criminalizes cameras/surveillance equipment placed and left UNATTENDED on the PRIVATE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER PERSON without the owner/tenant's consent (Class A misdemeanor; Level 6 felony with priors/protective order). A person wearing a live/attended camera to record disputes, interactions, or police encounters — in public or on their own property — falls outside both statutes. No contrary controlling case law was located; confidence on this specific conclusion is medium-high given the statutory text is clear but no Indiana appellate decision was found applying it to a body-camera fact pattern.

What counts as a “private” conversation →

Indiana has no reasonable-expectation-of-privacy or "private conversation" gate at all in its recording-consent statute — the gate it uses instead is a communication-medium test, not a privacy test. Indiana's wiretap article (Ind. Code art. 35-33.5, "Interception of Telephonic or Telegraphic Communications") only regulates "interception" of an "electronic communication." I independently re-fetched both load-bearing definitions directly (FindLaw's official-code mirror) and confirm they are quoted verbatim in the underlying analysis: - Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-110 ("Electronic communication"): "means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, oral communication, digital information, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, a radio, or an electromagnetic, a photoelectronic, or a photo-optical system." [CONFIRMED verbatim] - Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-176 ("Interception"): "the intentional recording or acquisition of the contents of an electronic communication by a person other than a sender or receiver of that communication, without the consent of the sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device, or equipment under this article" (plus five listed carve-outs for certain unencrypted/common-carrier radio transmissions). [CONFIRMED verbatim] "Oral communication" is listed as one of the things that CAN constitute an "electronic communication" under § 35-31.5-2-110 — but only if transmitted "by a wire, a radio, or an electromagnetic, a photoelectronic, or a photo-optical system" (e.g., a phone call or VoIP connection). An ordinary face-to-face, unassisted spoken conversation is never "transmitted" by any such system, so it categorically fails to meet the definition and never enters the statute's scope — a medium-of-transmission gate, not a privacy-expectation gate. Indiana has no separate "oral communication" definitional category of the kind found in federal Title III (18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)) or in Flanagan/Clark-style reasonable-expectation-of-privacy states (e.g., California, Washington) that would sweep in-person conversations into the statute via a privacy analysis. I independently confirmed via Cornell LII that federal law's parallel definition, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12), affirmatively EXCLUDES "any wire or oral communication" — the opposite textual structure from Indiana's inclusive list — though both end up excluding ordinary in-person speech from coverage. CORRECTION to the prior draft: it is not accurate that no case law was found. Fetching the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Indiana guide — a source already in the researcher's own source list — surfaces, in its "in-person conversations" section: "The state's interception statute does not address the recording of in-person conversations. See Whitt v. Town of New Carlisle, No. 20A-CT-2279, 2021 WL 2010143, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. May 20, 2021)." I made repeated independent attempts to retrieve the underlying opinion (CourtListener web search and REST API, Casetext, Justia, Leagle, AnyLaw, vLex, Google Scholar, DuckDuckGo) and every attempt failed with 403/404/429/CAPTCHA responses, so I cannot independently confirm the facts, procedural posture, or how central this point was to the court's disposition. The WL-only citation format (no N.E.3d parallel) strongly suggests this is an unpublished Court of Appeals memorandum decision, which under Indiana's appellate rules carries persuasive, not binding, weight. But it is a real, specific, on-point citation supporting (not contradicting) this reading, so the honest statement is "one non-precedential appellate decision supports this reading, and none was found contradicting it" — not "no case law was located either way." Indiana's one-party consent rule only comes into play for a communication that first clears the medium-of-transmission threshold in the definition of "electronic communication" (Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-110) — i.e., a communication actually carried by wire, radio, or an electromagnetic/photoelectronic/photo-optical system (e.g., a phone call, VoIP call, text, or email). Because "interception" under § 35-31.5-2-176 is defined as acquisition of such a communication "by a person other than a sender or receiver... without the consent of the sender or receiver," a participant recording their own qualifying communication is never "intercepting" it at all, and even a non-participant's recording is lawful so long as either the sender or the receiver consents — i.e., only one participating party need consent (one-party consent, consistent with the existing row's consent_type field). An ordinary in-person, face-to-face conversation never clears the medium-of-transmission threshold in the first place, so it falls entirely outside the statute and no one's consent is required to record it, regardless of whether the setting is public or private, loud or hushed, or witnessed by third parties. Statutory text underlying this summary (§§ 35-31.5-2-110, 35-31.5-2-176, and the penalty/civil-remedy provisions at 35-33.5-5-5/5-4) was independently confirmed verbatim via direct fetch of the official-code text.

Biometric / voiceprint law →

No dedicated BIPA/CUBI-style biometric statute. Indiana instead has a comprehensive privacy law — the Indiana Consumer Data Protection Act (INCDPA, also abbreviated ICDPA in some secondary sources) — that treats "biometric data" as a subcategory of "sensitive data" requiring opt-in consent. This is a materially weaker regime than Illinois BIPA. — Two things determine whether the INCDPA even reaches a voice-enrollment feature. (1) Definitional scope: IC 24-15-2-4 defines "biometric data" as data "generated by automatic measurements of an individual's biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint, a voiceprint, images of the retina or iris, or other unique biological patterns or characteristics," used "to identify a specific individual" — but explicitly excludes "a physical or digital photograph, or data generated from a physical or digital photograph" and "a video or audio recording, or data generated from a video or audio recording." So the raw captured audio itself is not "biometric data" — only a derived voiceprint/identifier generated from it counts. Once live.law derives a voiceprint template to distinguish wearer from bystanders, that template is "biometric data," and IC 24-15-2-28 classifies "genetic or biometric data that is processed for the purpose of uniquely identifying" an individual as "sensitive data." (2) Applicability threshold: the whole article only binds controllers that during a calendar year either "control[] or process[] personal data of at least one hundred thousand (100,000) consumers who are Indiana residents," or "control[] or process[] personal data of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) consumers who are Indiana residents and derive[] more than fifty percent (50%) of gross revenue from the sale of personal data" (IC 24-15-1-1). A company below that scale processing Indiana residents' voiceprints is simply not covered by this statute at all. If covered, IC 24-15-4-1 requires the controller to obtain the consumer's "consent" before processing sensitive data (i.e., before generating/using the voiceprint), and IC 24-15-2-7 defines "consent" as "a clear affirmative act" — "a written statement, including a statement written by electronic means, or any other unambiguous affirmative action" — signifying "freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous agreement." Unlike BIPA, there is no biometric-specific requirement of a signed written release, no mandated public retention/destruction schedule for biometric data specifically, and no per-violation statutory damages — general opt-in consent (which the INCDPA requires for all "sensitive data" categories alike) is the operative gate, enforced only by the AG.

Attorney ethics (ABA Formal Op. 01-422) →

Indiana has a squarely on-point ethics opinion, and it takes the strict, per-se-unethical position that ABA Formal Opinion 01-422 later abandoned nationally. In ISBA Legal Ethics Committee Opinion No. 1 of 2000, the Committee was asked whether it violated Rule 8.4(c) for plaintiff's counsel in a medical malpractice case to surreptitiously tape-record a telephone conversation - without disclosure - with an attorney who represented the employer of a potential witness (the recording's existence was revealed only later, when the employer's counsel was called to testify at an ancillary hearing). The Committee held it did violate Rule 8.4(c), expressly regardless of the fact that the conduct is legal under Indiana law (the opinion itself states "it is not illegal in the state of Indiana to tape record another person without that person's knowledge"). Verified direct quotes from the primary-source PDF: "Although it is not illegal in the state of Indiana to tape record another person without that person's knowledge, it is unethical for an attorney to do this to another attorney in the context of a pending legal matter without informing him first." And: "Irrespective of the purpose for which the eventual recordings are to be used, it is dishonest and deceitful for an attorney to tape-record another attorney during a telephone conversation regarding legal matters without informing the other attorney of such... the Committee perceives such conduct to be fundamentally deceitful and dishonest." The Committee distinguished recording from note-taking or post-conversation memoranda ("the Committee believes that a tape recording is fundamentally different from other methods of memorializing the conversation"), reasoned that undisclosed recording undermines the candor attorneys need in off-the-record settlement/plea discussions, and invoked Indiana Supreme Court authority that lawyers are "expected to assiduously avoid deceptive or discourteous conduct" (citing Fire Insurance Exchange v. Bell, 643 N.E.2d 310, 312-13 (Ind. 1994)). The opinion expressly adopts the reasoning of Alaska Bar Association Opinion 78-1 and cites "accord ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 337 (1974)" - i.e., the old national per-se rule that ABA 01-422 (June 2001) later withdrew. Caveats, all confirmed accurate on independent review: (1) Indiana's opinion issued March 2000, roughly 15 months before ABA 01-422 existed (June 2001), so it independently reached the same per-se-unethical conclusion Formal Opinion 337 had reached rather than responding to 01-422 - and no subsequent Indiana ethics opinion or disciplinary case revisiting this question post-2001 could be located (targeted searches for later ISBA opinions or Indiana disciplinary cases citing Rule 8.4(c) and undisclosed recording turned up nothing beyond this 2000 opinion). (2) The opinion's facts and holding concern an attorney recording another attorney in a pending legal matter; its "fundamentally deceitful and dishonest" reasoning is broad enough that Indiana authorities would very likely extend it to recording of clients or other lawyers generally, but no Indiana authority squarely extends it to recording of witnesses, adverse parties, or clients specifically. (3) This is a non-binding advisory ethics opinion ("The opinions are advisory only. The opinions have no force of law." - quote confirmed verbatim in the source), not a disciplinary case or court rule - it is the clearest and most direct Indiana authority found, but is advisory rather than binding precedent. Net effect for the live.law dataset: Indiana should be treated as a jurisdiction where a lawyer's undisclosed recording of another lawyer (and likely more broadly) is treated by state ethics authority as presumptively/per-se unethical professional misconduct under Rule 8.4(c), notwithstanding that such recording is legal under Indiana's one-party-consent wiretap law - i.e., Indiana has NOT adopted the more permissive ABA 01-422 standard. One correction from the original draft: the recorded attorney was counsel for the employer of a potential witness, not "opposing (defense) counsel" in the malpractice suit itself as the prior draft stated; this doesn't change the holding (the opinion's rule covers "another attorney... in connection with a pending legal matter" generally) but the fact pattern should be described accurately.

Can you personally sue over a violation?

Yes — this state gives a private right of action, not just criminal/regulatory enforcement.

Can I record as a guest in someone else's home?

Indiana doesn't lean hard on where you're standing — recording as a guest in someone else's home is treated much like recording anywhere else in the state.

What if I'm on a call with someone in another state?

Play it safe: if either state on the call requires everyone's okay to record, treat the whole call that way — don't assume Indiana's rule is the only one that matters just because you're the one wearing the glasses.

If it's legal to record, can it still be used against me later?

Usually, yes. Being legal to record and being protected from a future court case are two different questions — a legal recording can generally still be obtained by the other side later. A third person being briefly or incidentally present doesn't automatically wreck that protection here, but it's still not something to count on. Recording your own conversation with your own attorney is a separate, more protected situation, but almost everything else — a landlord, a police officer, a family member — isn't automatically off-limits to opposing counsel just because it was legal to capture.

This is a newer, less-settled corner of the law — our own research is still being refined here, so treat this as a starting point, not a final answer.